Esse qua esse? Sein als Sein?

I. Intro

This paper examines how being can be predicated in relation to the divine essence. Its aim is to place the Thomistic account of analogy in conversation with Kant’s restrictions on predication and to consider what follows for the intelligibility of our cognition of objects. The thesis of the paper is that the analogical predication of being is necessary for coherent cognition and that denying it generates an internal tension that weakens the foundations of metaphysics and limits our ability to predicate anything meaningful of God. The discussion proceeds by drawing first on Aquinas for the structure of analogical naming, then by clarifying the conceptual difference between univocal, equivocal and analogical predication, and finally by evaluating the philosophical consequences of each account in order to determine whether a system that limits predication to appearances can sustain metaphysical reasoning or whether a richer account of being is required.

II. Textual evidence

The proposition under consideration is that being can be predicated analogically of God and creatures. Thomas Aquinas develops this claim chiefly in Summa Theologiae I, question 13, articles 4, 8, and 9, and in De Veritate question 3, article 4. These texts situate the question within his metaphysics of being, participation, and cognition. Thomas begins by identifying being as the first intelligible and then clarifies the sense in which ens can apply across diverse modes of existence without collapsing the distinction between finite and infinite being (cf. Lagrange 112–115). In ST I.13.4, Thomas argues that being is said analogically of God and creatures. Univocal predication is rejected because it would make divine esse identical in meaning to participated creaturely esse, eliminating the distinction between necessary and contingent existence (Lagrange 118). Equivocal predication is also rejected because it destroys intelligibility by depriving language of any stable reference grounded in causality. Analogical predication alone preserves a proportional similarity rooted in participation: creatures receive being, while God is actus purus. Thomas’s claim in De Veritate 3.2 that whatever is in a thing exists by participation from the first cause reinforces this view and shows why analogy safeguards both cognitive access to reality and the asymmetry between Creator and creature.

In ST I.13.8, Thomas links analogical naming directly to causality. Because God is the cause of all beings, predicates must differ in sense proportionally to the causal relation (Lagrange 122–124). God’s being is necessary and underived, while creaturely being is contingent and received. Analogical predication maps this hierarchy onto language and ensures metaphysical coherence. De Veritate 3.4 generalizes this to all perfections, and ST I.13.9 explicitly states that predication of a cause names the effect in a diminished mode and the cause in a supereminent mode. Thus analogy functions as both a metaphysical and linguistic principle.

To place this in a modern context, one must consider Kant’s analysis of predication in Critique of Pure ReasonA158/B197. Kant maintains that being cannot be a real predicate of noumena, because such predication adds nothing to a concept without a corresponding intuition (Allison 142–145). Noumena cannot be given in the conditions of sensibility and therefore cannot be subjects of real predicates. Predication applies only to phenomena, which appear within the structures of space, time, and the categories. A distant star illustrates this limit. As phenomenon, it can be predicated with properties like temperature or luminosity. As noumenon, no such predicates apply in the same sense because they depend on the conditions of appearance (Allison 156). A similar structure appears in Kant’s treatment of moral freedom: the empirical self is bound by causal laws, while the noumenal self must be posited but cannot receive empirical predicates.

Thomistic metaphysics proceeds differently. Being is the primary intelligible and is predicated in ways that track real ontological relations rather than remaining within the limits of sensibility (Lagrange 131–134). Finite beings participate in being; God is pure act. Predication is therefore a way of grasping real dependence and causal order. The distant star exists and possesses properties in virtue of a participated act of existence, even when not directly perceived. Analogical predication proportionally adjusts the meaning of being to fit the ontological grade of the subject. Kant distinguishes concepts from judgments and insists that categories apply only to appearances, while Thomas grounds these relations in being itself, not in epistemic structures (Allison 161; Lagrange 140). Thus Kant’s restriction introduces a methodological boundary that Thomistic realism does not share.

IV. Philosophical- conceptual Analysics

The necessity of analogical predication becomes clearer through its formal structure. Let O(x) indicate that x is an object of cognition, B(x) that being is predicated of x, and A(x) that predication is analogical. Thomistic metaphysics requires that anything known must fall under being; formally, ∀x [O(x) → B(x)]. Since God and creatures are objects of cognition, B(G) and ∀x [C(x) → B(x)] follow. Analogical predication guarantees that being is attributed in proportion to ontological status. Without this structure, univocity collapses the distinction between necessary and contingent being, and equivocity destroys the stability of cognition. Either outcome produces the epistemic dissonance Thomas warns against when he denies both univocity and equivocity (Lagrange 119).

Analogical predication is grounded in participation. Finite beings receive being from God, and the intellect grasps distinctions and causality only by proportioning its predications to the modes of existence involved. A distant star, though not directly intuited, is still intelligible as a contingent being whose properties reflect a derived act of existence. If ◻B(x) expresses the necessity of predicating being for cognition, then denying analogical structure, ◇¬A(x), produces incoherence by breaking the proportional relation that unifies cause and effect.

Kant’s system denies that being functions as a real predicate of noumena. Predication is restricted to appearances structured by the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding (Allison 148–152). By contrast, Thomistic metaphysics treats analogical predication as necessary for recognizing real participation and ontological dependence even without intuition. Kantian constraints cannot account for this metaphysical grounding because they permit predication only within the phenomenal domain. Thus analogical predication secures a level of intelligibility that the Kantian framework cannot mirror.

The argument can be summarized formally. First, O(x) → B(x). Second, B(x) must be univocal, equivocal, or analogical. Univocity erases the distinction between necessary and contingent being. Equivocity erases intelligibility. Therefore the only coherent option is analogical predication. If ◻B(x) is required for cognition, then the denial of A(x) yields contradiction and produces an epistemic instability that undermines metaphysical reasoning.

Analogical predication finally secures proportionality between divine and creaturely perfections. Predicating goodness or wisdom analogically preserves creaturely dependence while safeguarding divine transcendence. This proportionality stabilizes cognition by allowing knowledge of contingent beings without erasing their relation to necessary being. Kant’s system, by limiting predication to appearances, cannot supply this metaphysical grounding (Allison 165; Lagrange 145).

V. Conclusion

This analysis suggests that analogical predication is the only structure capable of sustaining coherent metaphysical reasoning, since it secures a proportional relation between God and creatures and preserves both likeness and real distinction. Univocal and equivocal predication each fail to maintain this balance, while analogy explains how the intellect can speak meaningfully about necessary and contingent being. Comparison with Kant’s restriction of predication to phenomena reveals a tension, since a purely formal account of appearances cannot explain participation or metaphysical dependence in their full reality. Thomistic metaphysics avoids this difficulty by grounding predication in real participation and by maintaining the order of finite and infinite being.

Sources:

Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and enlarged ed., Yale University Press, 2004.

Aquinas, Thomas. De Veritate. Translated by Robert W. Schmidt, Henry Regnery Company, 1954.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Edited by John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd ed., Latin-English Edition, Aquinas Institute, 2012.

Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. Translated by Patrick Casey, St. Michael’s Abbey Press, 2015.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998.